Mark McKergow & Kirsten Dierolf
Abstract While we are encouraged by the appearance of articles about neuroscience which support SF practice, we urge caution in interpreting these findings on three grounds. The different grammars of neuroscience (molecular grammar) and SF prac- tice (people grammar) are not transposable, and according to Wittgenstein one cannot be reduced to the other. There is a risk of falling for the mereological fallacy – applying to a part (a brain) something which can only be applied to a whole (a person). Finally, the fundamentally social aspect of language calls into question our everyday assumptions about the links between mind, brain and language. Wittgenstein and others offer a way to say what can be said clearly, and to be as unmuddled as possible in our investigations and discussions.
Steve-De-Shazer
Abstract We intend to reproduce key papers from the development of the SF approach. Many of these are now hard to find, even if one knows where to look. We hope that reviewing and reading this work will help to cement the idea that SF is a highly distinctive approach with an internal logic which is both everyday and yet is hard to pin down. This issue we start with a piece by Steve de Shazer from 1997, where he makes a clear call for being wary of muddles in language, and shows how SF can help dismantles these muddles.
Biba Rebolj
Introduced by Lilian Ing I love experiencing and working with people from different cultures, and this is what attracted me to this online workshop. I was not disappointed: 22 cultures were present at the meeting, bringing not only their wealth of diversity but also the common ground of being SF Practitioners. SF group learning is always fun, vibey, collaborative and light, and this session was no exception!